

# *Physical Unclonable Functions*

## *Coded Modulation, Shaping, and Helper Data Schemes*

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# Acknowledgment

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Institute of Microelectronics

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Institute of Microelectronics

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# *Introduction*

## Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs):

- physical hardware object
- unique, unpredictable, and uncontrollable  
due to random physical processes at the time of production
- cannot be duplicated or cloned, i.e., are physically unclonable

## Modes of Operation:

- “strong” PUFs: the response is dependent on a challenge
- “weak” PUFs: a unique fingerprint is delivered (considered here)  
maybe better: *physical unclonable “object” / physical unclonable “fingerprint”*

## Observation and Approach:

- repeated PUF readout vary (slightly)  
due to variations in temperature, supply voltage, aging, ...
- readout has to be stabilized — channel coding has to be applied



# Introduction (II)

**Procedure:** fuzzy extractors / secure sketch

- **Initialization / Enrollment**

based on the PUF readout *helper data (HD) is generated*

the helper data must not reveal any information about the PUF readout and may be public


- **Reproduction**

based on the noisy PUF readout and the helper data a stable (binary) word / key is generated

## Applications:

- derivation of cryptographic keys / inherent key storage  
the PUF is private and the helper data may be public
- identification / countermeasure against product piracy  
the PUF is public and the helper data is private

[DRS'07]



# Introduction (III)

## Research Areas and Directions:

### *Microelectronics*

more stable PUF architectures, efficient implementation of coding schemes, ...

e.g., [MHV'12], [HBO'16], [MHK<sup>+</sup>'19], [KFPW'22]

### *Computer Science*

protocols, security, attacks, ...

e.g., [GCDD'02], [DRS'07], [MSSS'12], [Teb'22]

### *Information Theory*

fundamental procedures and limits, ...

e.g., [AC'93], [Mau'93], [CN'00], [IW'09], [GFBP'23]

### *Coding Theory*

design suited channel coding schemes

e.g., [Mae'13], [PMBHS'15], [Müe'19], [FM'22]

- *Classical Binary PUFs and Problem Statement*
- *Soft-Output PUFs*
- *Coded Modulation and Shaping*
- *Helper Data for Improved Decoding*
- *FPGA Implementation*


# *Classical Binary PUFs*



# Ring Oscillator PUFs

## Ring Oscillator: (“silicon PUF”)


- loop of an odd number of inverters (NOT gates)
- the circuit oscillates with a certain frequency  
actual value depends on uncontrollable variations within the manufacturing process



## Classical Ring Oscillator PUF (ROPUF):

[GCDD'02]

- sign of frequency difference  $f_{\text{diff}}$  is extracted




- basic block for generating a single random variable — *PUF node*, *PUF cell*, or *PUF unit*

Notation: quantities over  $\mathbb{R}$  are typeset as  $x, e, \dots$  — quantities over  $\mathbb{F}_2$  are typeset in Fraktur font;  $\mathfrak{x}, \mathfrak{y}, \dots$

# Classical PUFs

## Extracted Information / Entire PUF:

- $n$  *independent* PUF nodes constitute the PUF



- PUF readout vector  $\mathbf{x} = [x_1, \dots, x_n] \in \mathbb{F}_2^n$
- $x_i$  *uniformly* and *independently* distributed
- each PUF instance has a unique readout  $\mathbf{x}$



# Classical PUFs (II)

## Extracted Information:

- each PUF instance has a unique *reference readout*  $\mathbf{x}_{\text{puf}}$   $\Rightarrow$  *randomness in the manufacturing process*



## Problem:

- repeatedly requested readouts will vary (slightly)  $\Rightarrow$  *randomness in the readout process*  
due to variations in temperature, supply voltage, aging, ...
- instability is traditionally modeled by a binary symmetric channel (BSC)

$$\mathbf{y}_{\text{puf}} = \mathbf{x}_{\text{puf}} \oplus \mathbf{e}_{\text{puf}}$$

error pattern  $\mathbf{e}_{\text{puf}}$  — usual assumption: bit error probability  $p_{\text{BSC}} \approx 0.14$

e.g., [MHV'12], [MPMHS'14], [PMBHS'15]

$\Rightarrow$  *employ channel coding*

- However: the reference PUF readout  $\mathbf{x}_{\text{puf}}$  is not a valid code word

# Classical PUFs (III)


## Initialization / Enrollment Phase:

- the *reference PUF readout*  $\mathbf{x}_{\text{puf}}$  is measured
- choice: – binary channel code (rate  $k/n$ )  
– binary message word  $\mathbf{m}$  of length  $k$  — the corresponding code word  $\mathbf{c}$  is generated
- *helper data* is calculated as — *code-offset algorithm*

e.g., [JW'99], [LT'03], [DRS'04]

$$\mathbf{h} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \mathbf{c} \oplus \mathbf{x}_{\text{puf}}$$

- visualization



# Classical PUFs (IV)

## Reproduction Phase:


- noisy PUF readout

$$\boldsymbol{\eta}_{\text{puf}} = \boldsymbol{x}_{\text{puf}} \oplus \boldsymbol{e}_{\text{puf}} = \boldsymbol{c} \oplus \boldsymbol{h} \oplus \boldsymbol{e}_{\text{puf}}$$

- application of helper data

$$\boldsymbol{\eta} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \boldsymbol{\eta}_{\text{puf}} \oplus \boldsymbol{h} = \boldsymbol{c} \oplus \boldsymbol{e}_{\text{puf}}$$

- visualization




- standard (hard-decision) channel decoding reveals the message  $\boldsymbol{m}$

# Classical PUFs (V)

## Model of the PUF:

- visualization



- randomness in the manufacturing process —  $\mathbf{x}_{\text{puf}}$
- randomness in the readout process —  $\mathbf{e}_{\text{puf}}$

## **Imagination** of a Digital Communication Scheme:


- randomly selected message  $\mathbf{m}$  of length  $k$
- encoding and application of helper data gives  $\mathbf{x}_{\text{puf}}$
- secret (key) to be retrieved: **message  $\mathbf{m}$**

# Security of PUFs

**Requirements:** ( $I(\cdot; \cdot)$ : mutual information)

- the PUF (reference) readout  $\mathbf{x}_{\text{puf}}$  and the helper data  $\mathbf{h}$  are known  
 $\Rightarrow$  *the message  $\mathbf{m}$  has to be decodable*

$$I(\mathbf{m}; \{\mathbf{x}_{\text{puf}}, \mathbf{h}\}) = k$$



- only the PUF (reference) readout  $\mathbf{x}_{\text{puf}}$  is known  
 $\Rightarrow$  *no leakage must occur*

$$I(\mathbf{m}; \mathbf{x}_{\text{puf}}) = 0$$



- only the helper data  $\mathbf{h}$  is known  
 $\Rightarrow$  *no leakage must occur*

$$I(\mathbf{m}; \mathbf{h}) = 0$$




**Interpretation:**

- the readout  $\mathbf{x}_{\text{puf}}$  is a *one-time pad* for the codeword  $\mathbf{c}$  and vice versa

# Interpretation

## Channel Coding Problem:

- generation of and communication via *helper data*




## Source Coding Problem:

- Slepian–Wolf / Wyner–Ziv encoding

e.g., [GISK'19]

- *message  $m$  as additional randomness*
- *message  $m$  has to be recovered*






# Numerical Examples

## Word Error Ratio (WER) over the BSC Error Probability:

- PUF nodes: 1024  
mess. length: 61 to 717  
rate:  $R = 0.06$  to  $0.7$   $\left[\frac{\text{bit}}{\text{node}}\right]$
- hard-decision decoding
- Polar code
  - codelength  $n = 1024$
  - rate  $R = 0.06$  to  $0.7$



# Problem Statement

## Channel Coding:

- **Situation:** vast majority of the literature is on *binary* codes and *hard-decision* decoding
- **However:** PUFs extract randomness from analog sources

## Improvements: (the number $n$ of PUF nodes is fixed)


- longer messages  
extract more than one bit of entropy per readout symbol ( $k > n$ )  
⇒ *multi-valued PUFs / coded modulation*  
e.g., [TSB<sup>+</sup>06], [BNCF'14], [GI'14], [WHGS'16]  
[ZPK<sup>+</sup>16], [CBD<sup>+</sup>17], [IOK<sup>+</sup>18], [MHM<sup>+</sup>20]
- higher reliability  
⇒ *utilize the soft output / advanced helper schemes*  
e.g., [MTV'09], [MPSB'19], [MMOF'21], [KFPW'22]

# *Soft-Output PUFs*



# Ring Oscillator PUFs

## Soft-Decision Decoding:

- the real-valued frequency difference  $f_{\text{diff}}$  is utilized directly — reliability information




- measurement campaign at the Institute of Microelectronics using FPGA ROPUFs



# Ring Oscillator PUFs

## Soft-Decision Decoding:

- the real-valued frequency difference  $f_{\text{diff}}$  is utilized directly — reliability information



- AWGN model


$$\mathbf{y}_{\text{puf}} = \mathbf{x}_{\text{puf}} + \mathbf{e}_{\text{puf}}$$

- reference/nominal readout  $\mathbf{x}_{\text{puf}}$  and error  $\mathbf{e}_{\text{puf}}$  are approx. zero-mean Gaussian distributed
- scaling factor  $c$  such that  $\sigma_x^2 = 1$  (per element)
- error variance:  $\sigma_e^2 < 0.01$



# Soft-Output PUFs

## Model of the PUF:

- we *imagine* a digital communication scheme — soft-decision




- random mapping — *mapping bits to regions*
  - randomness at the transmitter
  - $q_i$  determines the region — the actual number  $x_{\text{puf},i}$  is drawn randomly according to a Gaussian pdf
  - individual but fixed for each PUF node (instance and position  $i$  in the codeword)
- Gaussian PUF readout vs. BPSK signaling



# Soft-Output PUFs

## Model of the PUF:

- we *imagine* a digital communication scheme — soft-decision



## Initialization:

- determination of the actual region  $\mathbf{q}$
  - encoding of the message to  $\mathbf{c}$
  - calculation of helper data
    - $\mathbf{c}$ : desired region
    - $\mathbf{q}$ : actual region
- $\Rightarrow \mathbf{h} = \mathbf{c} \oplus \mathbf{q}$

# Soft-Output PUFs (II)

## Soft-Decision Decoding:

- decoding metric: *log-likelihood ratio* (LLR)

$$\text{LLR} = \log \left( \frac{\Pr\{\mathbf{c}=\mathbf{0}|y_{\text{puf}}\}}{\Pr\{\mathbf{c}=\mathbf{1}|y_{\text{puf}}\}} \right) = \log \left( \frac{f_y(y_{\text{puf}}|\mathbf{c}=\mathbf{0})}{f_y(y_{\text{puf}}|\mathbf{c}=\mathbf{1})} \right)$$

- BPSK over the AWGN channel



$$\text{LLR} = \mp \frac{2}{\sigma_e^2} y_{\text{puf}} , \quad \begin{array}{l} -, \mathbf{h} = \mathbf{0} \\ +, \mathbf{h} = \mathbf{1} \end{array}$$

- Gaussian PUF readout

$$\text{LLR} = \pm \log \left( \frac{Q(+F y_{\text{puf}})}{Q(-F y_{\text{puf}})} \right) , \quad \begin{array}{l} +, \mathbf{h} = \mathbf{0} \\ -, \mathbf{h} = \mathbf{1} \end{array}$$

with  $F \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \frac{1}{\sqrt{1+\sigma_e^2} \sigma_e}$

$$Q(x) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \int_x^\infty \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi}} e^{-\frac{z^2}{2}} dz \quad (\text{complementary Gaussian integral function})$$






# Numerical Examples

Capacities over the Signal-to-Noise Ratio (in dB):


- BPSK
- Gaussian readout



# Numerical Examples (II)

Word Error Ratio (WER) over the Signal-to-Noise Ratio (in dB):

- PUF nodes: 1024  
mess. length: 717  
rate:  $R = 0.7$   $\left[\frac{\text{bit}}{\text{node}}\right]$
- Polar code
  - codelength  $n = 1024$
  - rate  $R = 0.7$




# *Coded Modulation and Shaping*


# Situation

## Binary Soft-Output PUF:

- generation of and communication via *helper data*



- mapping bits to *regions*





## Challenge:

- increase code rate / size of the message  $m$  — extract more than one bit per PUF node  
⇒ *employ higher-order modulation / coded modulation*

# Regions and Schemes

## PUF Readout and Regions:

- regions for 4-ary signaling





- regions  $\mathcal{R}_\rho$
- natural labeling:
  - label  $\mathbf{c} = [c_1 c_0]$
  - region number  $\rho = [c_1 c_0]_2$
- for  $L = 0.675$  the regions are drawn with the same probability  
 $\Rightarrow$  *4-ary uniform scheme*

# Regions and Schemes


## PUF Readout and Regions:

- regions for 4-ary signaling



## Model of the PUF:

- we *imagine* a digital communication scheme





- *mapping bits to regions* — the actual number is drawn randomly according to a Gaussian pdf
- suited helper data scheme required



# Regions and Schemes (II)

## PUF Readout and Regions:



- 4-ary uniform signaling ( $L = 0.675$ )



- 8-ary uniform signaling





- 8-ary non-uniform signaling / shaping



# Regions and Schemes (III)

**Multilevel Encoder and Multistage Decoding:** here:  $M = 8$ ,  $\mu = \log_2(M)$

- scheme for uniform signaling






# Regions and Schemes (III)

**Multilevel Encoder and Multistage Decoding:** here:  $M = 8$ ,  $\mu = \log_2(M)$

- scheme for uniform signaling



- specification by *codematrix* (code of length  $n$ )


$$\mathbf{m} \xrightarrow{\text{ENC}} \mathbf{c} = \begin{array}{ccccccc} \mathbf{c}_{\mu-1,1} & \mathbf{c}_{\mu-1,2} & \mathbf{c}_{\mu-1,3} & \cdots & \mathbf{c}_{\mu-1,i} & \cdots & \mathbf{c}_{\mu-1,n} \\ \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots \\ \mathbf{c}_{0,1} & \mathbf{c}_{0,2} & \mathbf{c}_{0,3} & \cdots & \mathbf{c}_{0,i} & \cdots & \mathbf{c}_{0,n} \end{array} = \begin{bmatrix} \mathbf{c}^{(\mu-1)} \\ \vdots \\ \mathbf{c}^{(0)} \end{bmatrix}$$

Region Number     $\rho_1$      $\rho_2$      $\rho_3$      $\cdots$      $\rho_i = [\mathbf{c}_{\mu-1,i} \cdots \mathbf{c}_{0,i}]_2$      $\cdots$      $\rho_n$

# Regions and Schemes (III)

**Multilevel Encoder and Multistage Decoding:** here:  $M = 8$ ,  $\mu = \log_2(M)$

- scheme with trellis shaping (highest level has rate 1/2)



- specification by *codematrix* (code of length  $n$ )


$$\mathbf{m} \xrightarrow{\text{ENC}} \mathbf{c} = \begin{array}{ccccccc} \mathbf{c}_{\mu-1,1} & \mathbf{c}_{\mu-1,2} & \mathbf{c}_{\mu-1,3} & \cdots & \mathbf{c}_{\mu-1,i} & \cdots & \mathbf{c}_{\mu-1,n} \\ \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots \\ \mathbf{c}_{0,1} & \mathbf{c}_{0,2} & \mathbf{c}_{0,3} & \cdots & \mathbf{c}_{0,i} & \cdots & \mathbf{c}_{0,n} \end{array} = \begin{bmatrix} \mathbf{c}^{(\mu-1)} \\ \vdots \\ \mathbf{c}^{(0)} \end{bmatrix}$$

Region Number     $\rho_1$      $\rho_2$      $\rho_3$      $\cdots$      $\rho_i = [\mathbf{c}_{\mu-1,i} \cdots \mathbf{c}_{0,i}]_2$      $\cdots$      $\rho_n$

# Numerical Examples


## Capacities over the Signal-to-Noise Ratio (in dB):

### ■ uniform:




- 4-ary Uniform
- 8-ary Uniform

### ■ shaping:



- 8-ary Shaping:  $\lambda = 0.70$
- 16-ary Shaping:  $\lambda = 0.35$
- highest level:  $R_{\mu-1} = 0.5$ , hard decision




# Helper Data Scheme

**First Approach:** generate a valid codeword in signal space

- employ *permutation* and *sign flip*
  - easy to implement
  - large number of bits required to store the helper data:  $\approx n(1 + \log_2(n))$
  - no perfect match possible

[FM'22]




# Helper Data Scheme

**First Approach:** generate a valid codeword in signal space

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  - no perfect match possible

[FM'22]




**Better Approach:** adapt LLR calculation

- employ a *conversion* of the region labels
  - applied element-wise
  - small number of bits required to store the helper data:  $n \log_2(M)$
  - ideal LLR calculation

# Helper Data Scheme (II)

## Calculation of Helper Data: uniform signaling

- visualization



ENC  
→

$\mathbf{e} =$

$\mathbf{c}_{\mu-1,1}$	$\mathbf{c}_{\mu-1,2}$	$\mathbf{c}_{\mu-1,3}$	⋯	$\mathbf{c}_{\mu-1,i}$	⋯	$\mathbf{c}_{\mu-1,n}$
⋮	⋮	⋮	⋮	⋮	⋮	⋮
$\mathbf{c}_{0,1}$	$\mathbf{c}_{0,2}$	$\mathbf{c}_{0,3}$	⋯	$\mathbf{c}_{0,i}$	⋯	$\mathbf{c}_{0,n}$



$\mathbf{x}_{\text{puf}}$

$\mathcal{Q}(\cdot)$   
→

$\mathbf{q} =$

$\mathbf{q}_{\mu-1,1}$	$\mathbf{q}_{\mu-1,2}$	$\mathbf{q}_{\mu-1,3}$	⋯	$\mathbf{q}_{\mu-1,i}$	⋯	$\mathbf{q}_{\mu-1,n}$
⋮	⋮	⋮	⋮	⋮	⋮	⋮
$\mathbf{q}_{0,1}$	$\mathbf{q}_{0,2}$	$\mathbf{q}_{0,3}$	⋯	$\mathbf{q}_{0,i}$	⋯	$\mathbf{q}_{0,n}$




- $[\mathbf{c}_{\mu-1,i} \cdots \mathbf{c}_{0,i}]_2$ : desired codesymbols
- $[\mathbf{q}_{\mu-1,i} \cdots \mathbf{q}_{0,i}]_2$ : obtained by quantization  $\mathcal{Q}(\cdot)$

# Helper Data Scheme (II)

## Calculation of Helper Data: uniform signaling

- visualization




- $[\mathbf{c}_{\mu-1,i} \ \cdots \ \mathbf{c}_{0,i}]_2$ : desired codesymbols
- $[\mathbf{q}_{\mu-1,i} \ \cdots \ \mathbf{q}_{0,i}]_2$ : obtained by quantization  $Q(\cdot)$
- helper data:  $\mathbf{h} = \mathbf{e} \oplus \mathbf{Q}$

# Helper Data Scheme (II)


## Calculation of Helper Data: uniform signaling

### ■ visualization



## Security: it can be shown

- message can be decoded when knowing the PUF readout and the helper data
- no leakage when knowing the PUF readout only
- no leakage when knowing the helper data only






# Helper Data Scheme (III)

## Calculation of Helper Data: shaped signaling

- visualization




ENC  
→

$\mathbf{e} =$

$c_{\mu-1,1}$	$c_{\mu-1,2}$	$c_{\mu-1,3}$	⋯	$c_{\mu-1,i}$	⋯	$c_{\mu-1,n}$
$\vdots$	$\vdots$	$\vdots$	$\vdots$	$\vdots$	$\vdots$	$\vdots$
$c_{0,1}$	$c_{0,2}$	$c_{0,3}$	⋯	$c_{0,i}$	⋯	$c_{0,n}$

$$\rho_i = [c_{\mu-1,i} \cdots c_{0,i}]_2$$



$x_{\text{puf}}$

$\mathcal{Q}(\cdot)$   
→

$\mathbf{Q} =$

$q_{\mu-1,1}$	$q_{\mu-1,2}$	$q_{\mu-1,3}$	⋯	$q_{\mu-1,i}$	⋯	$q_{\mu-1,n}$
$\vdots$	$\vdots$	$\vdots$	$\vdots$	$\vdots$	$\vdots$	$\vdots$
$q_{0,1}$	$q_{0,2}$	$q_{0,3}$	⋯	$q_{0,i}$	⋯	$q_{0,n}$


## Problem:

- region numbers not uniformly distributed — leakage

# Helper Data Scheme (III)

## Calculation of Helper Data: shaped signaling

- visualization




## Problem:

- region numbers not uniformly distributed — leakage

# Helper Data Scheme (III)

## Calculation of Helper Data: shaped signaling

- visualization



## Problem:

- region numbers not uniformly distributed — leakage

## Solution:

- $c_{\mu-1,i} \oplus q_{\mu-1,i+o}$  independent on  $[c_{\mu-2,i} \ \dots \ c_{0,i}]$

# Optimum Decoding

**LLR Calculation:** conversion helper scheme

- PUF readout  $\mathbf{y}_{\text{puf}} = [y_{\text{puf},1}, \dots, y_{\text{puf},n}]$
- LLR for label bit  $\mathbf{c}_{0,i}$

$$\text{LLR}(\mathbf{c}_{0,i}) = \log \left( \frac{\sum_{\forall \mathbf{q}, q_{0,i}=0 \oplus \mathbf{h}_{0,i}} \Delta Q(y_{\text{puf},i}, \mathcal{R}_{\mathbf{q}})}{\sum_{\forall \mathbf{q}, q_{0,i}=1 \oplus \mathbf{h}_{0,i}} \Delta Q(y_{\text{puf},i}, \mathcal{R}_{\mathbf{q}})} \right)$$

- definition

$$\Delta Q(y, \mathcal{R}_{\mathbf{c}}) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} Q(D L_{\rho} - F y) - Q(D L_{\rho+1} - F y)$$

with  $\mathcal{R}_{\mathbf{c}} = \mathcal{R}_{[\mathbf{c}_{\mu-1} \dots \mathbf{c}_0]}$  — lower limit  $L_{\rho}$ ; upper limit  $L_{\rho+1}$ ,  $\rho = [\mathbf{c}_{\mu-1} \dots \mathbf{c}_0]_2$


$$F \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \frac{1}{\sqrt{1+\sigma_e^2} \sigma_e}, \quad D \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \frac{\sqrt{1+\sigma_e^2}}{\sigma_e}$$

$$Q(x) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \int_x^{\infty} \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi}} e^{-\frac{z^2}{2}} dz \quad (\text{complementary Gaussian integral function})$$

# Numerical Examples

## Word Error Ratio (WER) over the Signal-to-Noise Ratio (in dB):

- PUF nodes: 1024  
mess. length: 1536  
rate:  $R = 1.5 \left[ \frac{\text{bit}}{\text{node}} \right]$
- Polar code
  - codelength  $n = 1024$
- MLC
  - 4-ary Uniform:  
 $k_0 = 523, k_1 = 1013$
  - 8-ary Uniform:  
 $k_0 = 106, k_1 = 439, k_2 = 991$
  - 8-ary Shaping:  
 $k_0 = 100, k_1 = 924, k_2 = 512$
- permutation vs. conversion




*Helper Data  
for Improved Decoding*

# Situation

## Coded Modulation / Shaping for PUFs:

- generation of and communication via *helper data*



- helper data enables decoding in the first place

## Improvement:

- recently, a *two-metric helper data scheme* was proposed
  - two possible quantizers are available at reconstruction (uncoded case)
  - reference PUF readout determines which quantizer should be used (per PUF node)
  - these binary flags establish the helper data


[DGS'19], [TKDP'21]

⇒ *generalization to M-ary coded modulation*


# Regions

## Regions for Uniform Signaling:

- visualization —  $M = 2, S = 1$



$$\begin{aligned} \tilde{x} &= \operatorname{erf}(x/\sqrt{2}) \\ x &= \sqrt{2} \operatorname{erf}^{-1}(\tilde{x}) \end{aligned}$$





$$\operatorname{erf}(z) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \frac{2}{\sqrt{\pi}} \int_0^z e^{-t^2} dt$$



# Regions

## Regions for Uniform Signaling:



- visualization —  $M = 2, S = 2$



# Regions

## Regions for Uniform Signaling:

- visualization —  $M = 4, S = 4$



- region limits for  $M$ -ary  $S$ -metric scheme

$$\tilde{L}_{\rho,s} = \tilde{L}_{\rho} + \frac{\tilde{L}_{\rho+1} - \tilde{L}_{\rho}}{S} s, \quad \begin{array}{l} \rho = 0, \dots, M - 1 \\ s = 0, \dots, S \end{array}$$



## Initialization Phase:

- quantization of the reference PUF readout  $\mathbf{x}_{\text{puf}}$  (limits  $L_{\rho,s}$ )  $\Rightarrow$  **region  $\rho$  and subregion  $s$**
- total helper data  $\mathcal{H} = \{ \mathfrak{H}, \mathbf{s} \}$   $\Rightarrow n (\log_2(M) + \log_2(S))$  bits

# Regions

## Regions for Uniform Signaling:

- visualization —  $M = 4, S = 4$




## Security:

- due to construction

$$\Pr\{s\} = \frac{1}{S}$$

and

$$p_{\rho,s} = \Pr\{x \in \mathcal{R}_{\rho,s}\} = \Pr\{x \in \mathcal{R}_{\rho}\} \frac{1}{S}$$



⇒ subregion number  $s$  is uniformly distributed



⇒ region number  $\rho$  and subregion number  $s$  are independent

⇒ *no leakage*

# Regions

## Regions for Shaping:

- visualization —  $M = 8, S = 2$



## Security:

- due to construction

$$\Pr\{s\} = \frac{1}{S}$$

and

$$p_{\rho,s} = \Pr\{x \in \mathcal{R}_{\rho,s}\} = \Pr\{x \in \mathcal{R}_{\rho}\} \frac{1}{S}$$

$\Rightarrow$  subregion number  $s$  is uniformly distributed



$\Rightarrow$  region number  $\rho$  and subregion number  $s$  are independent

$\Rightarrow$  **no leakage**

# Constellations



Active Constellation:  $M = 4$

■ conventional





■ 2-metric

$s = 0$




$s = 1$



# Numerical Examples

## Word Error Ratio (WER) over the Signal-to-Noise Ratio (in dB):


- PUF nodes: 1024  
mess. length: 1536  
rate:  $R = 1.5 \left[ \frac{\text{bit}}{\text{node}} \right]$
- Polar code  
- codelength  $n = 1024$
- MLC
- conversion helper scheme
- $S = 1, 2, 4, 8, 16$



# Numerical Examples (II)

# Side Information [bit/node] over Required Signal-to-Noise Ratio (in dB):

- PUF nodes: 1024
- mess. length: 1536
- rate:  $R = 1.5$  [bit/node]
- WER =  $10^{-6}$




# *FPGA Implementation*



## Specification:


- ROPUFs implemented on XILINX FPGAs at the Institute of Microelectronics
- 22 instances (evaluation boards) available
- each comprising 3800 ROs
- $n = 1024$  disjoint pairs of ROs randomly selected
- temperature from  $-10\text{ }^{\circ}\text{C}$  to  $50\text{ }^{\circ}\text{C}$  (in steps of  $10\text{ }^{\circ}\text{C}$ )
- reference readout  $x_{\text{ref}}$ : average of 10 readouts at  $20\text{ }^{\circ}\text{C}$
- 10,000 readouts per PUF instance and temperature (in total 70,000 readouts per PUF instance)
- schemes
  - 4-ary uniform
  - 8-ary uniform
  - 8-ary shaping



# FPGA Implementation (II)

Number of Word Errors: per 70,000 readouts


- PUF nodes: 1024
- mess. length: 1536
- rate:  $R = 1.50$   $\left[\frac{\text{bit}}{\text{node}}\right]$
- $S = 1$



# FPGA Implementation (II)

Number of Word Errors: per 70,000 readouts


- PUF nodes: 1024
- mess. length: 1792
- rate:  $R = 1.75$   $\left[\frac{\text{bit}}{\text{node}}\right]$
- $S = 1$



# FPGA Implementation (II)

Number of Word Errors: per 70,000 readouts


- PUF nodes: 1024
- mess. length: 1792
- rate:  $R = 1.75 \left[ \frac{\text{bit}}{\text{node}} \right]$
- $S = 1$  and 4



# FPGA Implementation (II)

Number of Word Errors: per 70,000 readouts


- PUF nodes: 1024  
mess. length: 2048  
rate:  $R = 2.00$   $\left[\frac{\text{bit}}{\text{node}}\right]$
- $S = 1$  and 4



# FPGA Implementation (II)

Number of Word Errors: per 70,000 readouts

- PUF nodes: 1024  
mess. length: 2304  
rate:  $R = 2.25 \left[ \frac{\text{bit}}{\text{node}} \right]$
- $S = 1$  and 4



## *Summary and Outlook*

# Summary and Outlook

## Error Correction for PUFs:

- utilizing the analog readout is rewarding
- PUF model: digital transmission with randomness at the transmitter
- design of coded modulation and shaping techniques ⇒ *increase in rate per PUF node*
- design of suited helper data ⇒ *increase in reliability*

## Further Directions:

- here: Gaussian model for signal and error ⇒ *adaptation to real-world data*
- here: (silicon) PUF as hardware device ⇒ *application to “channel PUFs”*
- here: practical designs (coded modulation / helper data) ⇒ *fundamental finite-length limits*



# *References*

# References

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- [CBD<sup>+</sup>'17] K.-H. Chuang, E. Bury, R. Degraeve, B. Kaczer, G. Groeseneken, I. Verbauwhede, D. Linten. Physically Unclonable Function Using CMOS Break-down Position. In *IEEE Int. Reliability Physics Symposium (IRPS)*, Monterey, CA, USA, pp. 4C-1.1–4C-1.7, 2017.
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